Introduction
This chapter provides a long-term historical perspective on (1) professional road cycling's economic agents, i.e. the public, race organizers, team sponsors and riders, and the relationships among them; (2) cycling's governing body, the International Cycling Union; and 
Economic aspects of professional road cycling: from local races to global sport events
Since the late 19 th century, the economic sector of professional cycling includes four main types of agents. The public is willing to pay and/or to watch advertisements in order to be able to follow the developments of a bicycle race. Sport event organizers are willing to pay for the race's logistics and prize money in order to sell newspapers, advertising space on the race and TV broadcast rights; race organizers may also auction off the race's route to the highest bidding host cities. Various team sponsors are willing to pay riders a wage (and perhaps to pay organizers a price) to advertise for their products on the race. Finally, riders are willing to spend energy and advertise for their sponsor to earn a wage and win the race's prize money.
How have long-term socioeconomic trends that occurred during the 20 th century, such as increasing income and leisure time, the diffusion of consumption goods such as television and the liberalization of markets, affected these agents and led to the emergence, the development and crises and the globalization of professional road cycling?
The emergence of professional road cycling (1890s-mid-1950s)
Bicycles as we know them -with a mobile handlebar, two equal-sized wheels, pedals, a chain, tires and then derailleur gears -were introduced from the 1880s on. Back then, bicycles symbolized speed and modernity (Gaboriau 1995) . As Western Europeans' real income increased (in Belgium, newspaper sales increased. This context led sport newspapers and bicycle companies to invest in the organization of bicycle races, i.e. to finance races' operating costs and prizes, in order to increase their own profits.
Although newspapers organized the first officially recorded road races as early as the late 1860s, until the 1880s most of the races were organized in velodromes, where they could charge entry fees (table 1.1). From the 1890s, newspapers started organizing races on public roads to show bicycles enabled to cover great distances and to boost their sales and their advertisement revenue. Most of these French, Belgian and Italian annual races from one city to another, now called "classics," were run on distances ranging from 250 to 400 km, which means that the best riders often had to race for more than 10 hours to complete the race.
Bordeaux-Paris and Paris-Brest-Paris, both created in 1891 (but discontinued in 1988 and 1951, respectively) even required the best riders to keep riding for more than 25 and 70 hours.
No wonder journalists described these races as epic fights between modern heroes.
Newspapers organized cycling, not soccer or boxing competitions, because a roadside spectator can watch a road race for a few seconds only. As a result, cycling fans demand more information and want pictures of the race, enabling newspapers to increase their circulation. Informaciones created the Vuelta a España (hereafter often shortened to Vuelta). Although free for spectators, these great three-week stage races boosted their organizers' profits by increasing their circulation and by generating additional revenue sources: cities were willing to pay race organizers to host certain stages, and various companies were ready to sponsor the race to advertise their brand on the competition's route. Since 1930 and 1933, respectively, the Tour and the Giro include a publicity caravan, i.e. dozens of vehicles preceding the riders by a few minutes and distributing product samples to spectators. Today, these three-week stage races, generally called the "Grand Tours", are the most popular, prestigious and lucrative bicycle races in the world and they are still organized by media companies. The
Tour de France has been organized by L' Auto (1903 Auto ( -1940 (1935 -1942 ), Ya (1945 -1950 ), El Correo Español -El Pueblo Vasco (1955 -1978 and Unipublic (since 1979) .
While newspapers organized the races, bicycle and tire companies sponsored the teams of riders, i.e. they paid for their food and accommodation so that they ride their material, prove its quality and promote their brand through logos on their jerseys and caps. The French tire company Michelin sponsored Charles Terront as early as the 1891 Paris-Brest-Paris, which he won. Among the most famous bicycle companies which sponsored riders are Tour winners Peugeot, Alcyon and Automoto, and Giro winners Bianchi and Legnano. Bicycle companies sponsored riders but rarely organized races themselves because the public would have suspected them of manipulating the race to advertise their brand (Calvet 1981) .
Even though certain champions raced in sponsored teams and had a fixed annual wage, most professional riders had no sponsor. They were called indépendants in French or isolati in Italian and they had no wage: all their income came from their race earnings. This is how, as early as the late 19 th century, cycling became a professional sport. Until the 1920s, the bigger part of a rider's income came from his race winnings. His fixed annual wage was relatively low, if there was any. French riders' wages were particularly low after the First World War (1919) (1920) (1921) , because the few remaining bicycle companies were able to cartelize the demand for riders and restrict the wages. From the 1930s (the 1930 Tour and the 1932 Giro), races started to be broadcast on the radio and fans could follow the race live and hear the voices of their champions. As bicycle races' popularity grew, so did riders' incomes. While sponsors had to offer better wages to recruit the greatest champions, race organizers had to increase the race winnings to make it in the champions' interest to both participate in their race and fight for victory.
The development and crises of professional road cycling (mid-1950s-mid-1980s)
As Western Europeans' real income increased quickly (the GDP per capita was multiplied by 4.6 from 1950 to 2000 (Maddison 2004 ) and Europe urbanized, people bought modern motorcycles rather than bicycles. As a consequence, bicycle companies started to reduce their investments in cycling teams and professional riders' fixed annual wages decreased. This made it in the riders' interest to look for new sponsors from outside of the bicycle industry. In 1954, Italian champion Fiorenzo Magni was the first rider who chose to be sponsored by an "extra-sportif" company (Nivea). While bicycle companies' control of cycling sponsorship eroded, they tried to make it illegal for extra-sportifs to sponsor teams, and in France they also garnered the support of race organizers, who feared that extra-sportifs' investments in sponsorship might decrease their advertisement in newspapers. Extra-sportif sponsors prevailed, though, and to this day they are the main sponsors of cycling teams.
Tour de France's national teams
Since the late 19 th century, sponsored riders and teams ride the Grand Tours, the classics and the other races in the name of their sponsor. The only races in which they compete in the name of their country are the Road Cycling World Championships and the Olympic Games' competitions. Another exception, though, has been the Tour de France, which was not run among sponsored teams but among national teams from 1930 to 1961, and also in 1967 and 1968. Why did the Tour organizers decide in 1930 to exclude sponsored teams from the race? In the 1920s the growing concentration of firms in the bicycle industry enabled certain companies to invest in team sponsorship much more than others. Their teams hired all of the best riders and were even willing to pay other teams to secure victory, so much so that the race lost much of its appeal. The Alcyon team won the 1927 Tour; it won first, second and third place in 1928; and it won again in 1929. This is why, even though sponsored teams were an important source of income for the Tour organizers, they were replaced in 1930 with national teams, which were supposed to be both more equal and less willing to fix the race. The Tour organizers not only banned sponsored teams until 1962, they also banned commercial advertising on riders' national clothing until 1956.
Why then did the Tour organizers decide in 1962 to admit sponsored teams back? In the mid-1950s, as bicycle companies stopped sponsoring teams, they were replaced by companies from various other sectors of the economy. The difference between sponsors from the bicycle industry and sponsors from other sectors is that for the latter riders' jerseys, not bicycles, are the main advertising element. Therefore, the extra-sportifs could not advertise for their products on the Tour, one of the very few races where teams and jerseys (and caps) represented countries instead of private companies. These new commercial sponsors pressured the Tour organizers to replace national teams with sponsored teams. They refused that the most popular champions they were hiring all year long, be included in any of the Tour's national teams. In 1962, the Tour organizers finally gave in and replaced national teams with privately sponsored teams.
As Western European employees' annual working time decreased (it was divided by 1.4 from 1950 to 2000 (Maddison 2004 ) and people spent more and more time watching TV, newspapers found bicycles races less and less profitable to organize. Races increased organizers' newspapers' circulation less than before, if only because races were also recalled by competing newspapers. Moreover, races yielded few TV broadcast rights, both because most TV channels were still public, which means they did not have to compete against each other to broadcast the races, and because compared to stadium sports of limited duration, bicycle races were hard to broadcast live (see chapter 5). Although the Grand Tours had been Race organizers' financial crisis led them to modify certain aspects of races: "split stages" enabled them to multiply the number of cities that paid them to host the race, "transfers" from one city to another enabled them to select only the best-paying cities, countless secondary prizes enabled them to multiply sponsors, etc.
Although riders' wages and prize winnings suffered a decline from the mid-1950s to the mid1980s, their overall labor incomes did not decrease. Indeed, while the European public had increasing income and leisure time but still few households had TV sets, people were willing to pay to take pictures of champions, shake their hands and have them sign autographs. This is why many small cities organized so-called criteriums, i.e. short one-day road races on a local circuit which paid riders to participate, meet their fans and sometimes to let a predetermined rider win (McKay 2011a) . Until the mid-1980s, criteriums' appearance fees provided the majority of a rider's annual income, which is why certain Grand Tour champions like Jacques Anquetil did not ride the classics. They rode the Grand Tours to become or stay famous and the criteriums to earn money. From the early 1950s, starting with Fausto Coppi in 1949, superstars usually gave their teammates all of their Grand Tours or classics' prize winnings, so as to make it in their interest to sacrifice for them. Superstars more than made up for these losses in the numerous, well-paid criteriums which invited the winners of the greatest races.
Criteriums were such an important income source that riders hired agents to place them in these races. However, these agents (for instance Frenchmen Daniel Dousset and Roger Piel and Belgian Jean van Buggenhout) became so influential that they gained considerable power over riders (McKay 2011) . Agents were even able to influence races' outcomes. Vuelta winner Angelino Soler migrated to France. After retiring, many riders opened bars or became bicycle sellers.
The globalization of professional road cycling since the mid-1980s
As transportation and information costs decreased over Europe and European markets integrated, it became in the interest of both race organizers and sponsors to globalize cycling. Moreover, while cycling teams had long been formed mostly of riders from one country and teams rode primarily in their own country, the nationalities of Grand Tour participants diversified over the years. And while race organizers had long tried to attract sponsors from their own country, they came to attract more foreign sponsors too. As a result, most of the th anniversary (1996) La Gazzetta dello Sport, which was created to cover the first Olympic Games of the modern era, had the Giro start in Athens, Greece. In chapter 14 globalization in professional road cycling is analyzed in detail. As technological advances enabled TV channels to increase the quality and duration of the live broadcast of cycling races, audiences grew, which increased the economic value of cycling sponsorship and also sponsors' willingness to pay riders higher wages (Sandy et al. 2004 Since the mid-1980s, riders' incomes have been increasing. Indeed, although in cycling there is still no redistribution of TV revenue to teams, the increased media coverage made companies more willing to pay riders high fixed wages. This is especially true for those few cyclists with the highest marginal productivity in terms of media coverage, which implies that the wages that have been increasing the most are those of cycling's superstars (Rosen 1981 Since then, however, the UCI is the sole governing body of cycling. Below we focus on three specific responsibilities of the UCI: the organization of a cycling calendar, the creation of a world ranking system and the set-up of race rules and anti-doping regulations. For a more detailed discussion of the overall organizational structure of professional cycling, we refer to chapter 2.
The organization of the cycling calendar
The UCI manages the cycling calendar, which is composed of different types of races ( Federico Bahamontes had done more than thirty years before. Until the 1990s, it was not uncommon either for riders to ride the Vuelta not to win it but to prepare for the Giro, as
Giuseppe Saronni openly admitted in 1983, or to ride the Giro to prepare for the Tour.
In the early 1990s, however, the UCI aimed at moving a Grand Tour from congested spring to September, in order to lengthen the racing season, increase sponsors' media coverage and thereby increase sponsors' investments in cycling. While the Giro refused, the Vuelta accepted. Instead of skipping the spring race or considering it as a mere preparation for another race, riders could now ride the Vuelta in September to redeem or crown their season, or to be selected for the World Championships. By attracting more prestigious riders and gaining more TV coverage, this reform undoubtedly increased the attractiveness, prestige and economic value of the Vuelta, even though it is sometimes still considered to be no more than a preparation for the World Championships. For example, in 2000, fourth-place Jan Ullrich quit the Vuelta to prepare for the Olympic Games and in 2007, points-jersey holder Oscar
Freire did the same to prepare for the World Championships. 
The creation of a world ranking system
The UCI also manages the ranking system which determines the world's best teams and riders of the year, based on their season-long results. Until 1988, the (unofficial) ranking systems were established independently from the UCI: several newspapers (L'Équipe, La Gazzetta dello Sport, Het Nieuwsblad-Sportwereld and Les Sports) first managed the "Desgrange-
Colombo Challenge" (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) and then the spirits company Pernod managed the "Super Prestige Pernod International" . It is only since 1989 that the UCI ranking system prevails, under the names of "UCI World Cup" (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , "UCI Pro Tour" (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) and "UCI World Tour" (since 2011). One purpose of the UCI reform of the ranking system was to increase competition and to reduce collusion among riders and teams. Indeed, riders have to accumulate UCI points all year long to be allowed to participate in the most prestigious and best-paying races. This reduces a rider's incentive to "sell" certain races, because UCI points are highly valuable both to themselves (they directly increase their value,
i.e. their wage) and to their team (they enable it to participate in those races where the sponsor gets the most media coverage). Another purpose of the UCI ranking system is to globalize cycling, by having non-European riders and teams participate in Western races and by including non-Western-European races in professional road cycling's calendar. This was expected to increase the quality of the show and bring additional (TV) spectators and commercial sponsors to cycling. In fact, the previous ranking systems already ranked riders according to their results in bicycle races all over European countries, which effectively made it in riders' interest to race abroad, thus contributing to the early globalization of cycling.
In 2005 the UCI decided that the World Cup would become a closed league under the name of UCI ProTour (see chapter 2). The 20 teams owning a four-year license had both the right and the obligation to participate in each of the then 27 annual ProTour races. Such organization effectively guaranteed team sponsors a high degree of media visibility for four years, which made them increase their investments in cycling. However, the UCI decided that the Pro Tour included not only classic races but also the Grand Tours, which means that the Tour, the Giro and the Vuelta now had to select the best-ranked ProTour teams instead of having teams pay to participate. Therefore, although the UCI ProTour garnered the support of team sponsors (because it made their return on investment more predictable) and riders (because it increased their wages and the duration of their labor contracts), the UCI Pro Tour was opposed by the organizers of the Grand Tours. 
The set-up of race rules and anti-doping regulations
The UCI also establishes the rules of bicycle races. Certain rules concern the equipment. as the 1890s, their use was prohibited until the 1933 Giro and the 1937 Tour, to make these epic races more difficult and more spectacular. Other UCI rules concern races themselves, including the maximum number of stages or total length of a stage race.
Although the basic principles of bicycle races might seem simple, the history of the Grand Tours' rules shows that many different rules may apply. Some rules determine which riders and teams may participate. Riders were not allowed to group into teams in many of the early Tours (1903 Tours ( -1909 Tours ( , 1919 Tours ( -1924 , because Tour organizers believed teams and mutual help made the race less heroic. This is also the reason why until the late 1920s Tour teammates
were not allowed to help each other to repair their broken material and until 1938 independent riders were not allowed to help each other in any way. By contrast, since the 1937 Tour, the 1947 Giro and the 1950 Vuelta, riders are not allowed to participate unless they are members of a team. Race organizers do no longer need unsponsored riders to fill the peloton. As we saw, sponsored teams have also been excluded from the Tour for a long time (1967) (1968) , because Tour organizers believed they tended to collude to share the prize pool instead of fighting for it.
Other rules determine which rider is the winner. The general classification ranking was decided by a points system in certain early Tours (1905 Tours ( -1912 and Giri (1909 Giri ( -1913 (1935, 1942, 1977), white (1941) , white with a red stripe (1945-1950), yellow (1955-1976, 1978-1997), gold (1998-2009) It should be noted that, as was clear from the discussion, most of these rules were defined by the Grand Tour organizers themselves, and not by the UCI. Still today, the power struggle between race organizers and the UCI (and in some cases the teams) on race regulation issues continues. In the past couple of years, this has been made clear on numerous occasions, for instance, in the discussion on the use of radio communication during the race.
The UCI also establishes anti-doping rules. As is described in detail in chapter 13, road cycling and doping have a long history. Already before World War II, riders used strychnine, cocaine and morphine. From the 1950s, they also used amphetamines, and each rider could easily detect who was taking "la bomba" (Fausto Coppi's words to describe doping), by looking at which riders had dilated pupils and kept drinking. From the 1970s, riders started using steroids and corticoids, notably cortisone. And from the 1990s, most riders used
Erythropoietin ( Previously, doping did not exist as a prohibited practice. A couple of years later, in 1966, the UCI was the first international federation to devote an entire chapter on doping in the regulations and the first to have urine samples analysed. Much later, the UCI was the first major sports association to make its athletes take blood tests for scientific research in 1996. In 2007, the UCI was the first federation to apply a blood passport and in 2011 once again the UCI was the first federation to establish a no-needle policy before, during and after races.
Still, in spite of all this efforts the UCI faces an image of failure when it comes to fight doping. This is, among other reasons, because it was long technically difficult to detect certain doping or masking substances. As a result, devising and organizing anti-doping controls was (and still is) very expensive. Furthermore, until at least the 1980s, most riders knew in advance when they would take an anti-doping test so they stopped doping temporarily or they took masking drugs. And from the late 1990s, when the UCI lacked a test for epo and set riders' hematocrit ceiling at 50%, the perverse effect of this rule was that riders wanting to be competitive doped themselves until they reached the ceiling. It is only since the late 2000s that anti-doping controls have become unpredictable and that doping seems to be fought more successfully by the UCI (Zorzoli and Rossi 2010).
The show of bicycle races: a century of 'Grand Tours'
Since the late 19 th century, bicycle races did not just globalize: the show changed in several other respects. Organizers adapted the Grand Tours to the public's demand, which helps explain professional cycling's enduring success. Franco's government brutally repressed. Thus, the race's start was supposed to prove the government's authority over the country.
National passions: the

Bicycle races and the twentieth-century wars
The 20 th -century wars affected bicycle races in several ways. First, wars cancelled several races. The first World War cancelled the Tour and the Giro (1915 Giro ( -1918 , as well as the five monuments except the Tour of Lombardy. The Spanish civil war cancelled the Vuelta (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) . The second World War cancelled the Tour (1940 Tour ( -1946 , the Giro (1941 Giro ( -1945 , the Vuelta (1943 Vuelta ( -1944 and the five monuments except the Tour of Flanders. Indeed, bicycle races could not be run in wartime because organizers lacked gasoline, food and tires, but also because roads were destroyed. It is these war devastations which led journalists to call the 1919 Paris-Roubaix the "hell of the North." Nevertheless, in a war-devastated country, Francisco Franco's government organized the 1941 Vuelta to give the population an illusion of normality, the only foreign participants came from neutral Switzerland. 
Epic races: Grand Tours' difficulty
Although Grand Tour organizers have kept finding ways to maintain or increase their races' epic character, many aspects of these races have changed over time, including their difficulty.
While the number of Grand Tours' participants varied between 50 and 150 until the early 1980s, since the 1990s it is closer to 200, the maximum number of riders in a race according to UCI regulations. In this respect, the 1926-1928 Giri, which included up to 300 riders, notably "isolati" riders related to political and military groups, were an exception.
Since the early 20 th century, each of the three Grand Tours lasts three weeks, but the number of racing days has increased substantially to the detriment of rest days. The very first Tours included less than ten racing days and at least one rest day per racing day, and until the mid1920s the Tour and the Giro still included less than 15 racing days and almost one rest day per racing day. Nowadays, the Grand Tours include 21 racing days and less than 0.1 rest day per racing day. In this sense, it would seem that, as cycling professionalized, the Grand Tours became more physically demanding.
However, as can be seen from figure 1.3, at the same time the mean distance per racing day strongly decreased, first abruptly in the 1920s (from around 350 kilometers to around 200 kilometers), and then continuously since the 1930s (from around 200 kilometers to around 160 kilometers today). This reflects organizers' anticipation of the public's changing demand.
Until the 1920s, when bicycles were a symbol of speed and modernity, the public wanted to read about long stages in which riders defied the forces of nature, staggeringly long distances and durations, mountains, rain and snow. In addition, the Grand Tours' sponsors wanted to prove the quality and resistance of their material in very hard conditions. The length of the stages required that riders start racing late at night or very early in the morning, so that they arrive in the afternoon and journalists could tell the story of the stage the day after. In the 1920s, when the Grand Tours started being broadcast on the radio, the public wanted to follow the race live, which given the limited radio time required more nervous, hence shorter, stages. In turn, the shortening of stages enabled organizers to increase the number of stages.
In the 2000s, the mean distance per racing day has been relatively shorter in the Vuelta than in the other two Grand Tours, perhaps partly because the Vuelta is now raced at the end of the cycling season. If organizers want to have a nervous race despite riders' tiredness, they need to organize relatively short stages. Therefore, as the media through which the public came to follow the Grand Tours changed, the public's demand changed and organizers adapted.
Grand Tours went from epic races with a few nonconsecutive but very long stages to other types of epic races with many consecutive but shorter stages.
Epic fights: riders' performance and Grand Tours' competitiveness
As Grand Tours' difficulty changed, riders' performances increased. Not only did their quit rate decrease, their mean speed also increased. While the early Grand Tours were deliberately very hard to finish (until the late 1920s around 75% of participants failed to finish races), riders' quit rate declined abruptly in the 1920s (from about 75% to about 50%), and it declined continuously since the 1930s (from around 50% to around 20% today). This likely reflects the 1920s drop in the mean distance per racing day, as well as the multiple ways which have made riders' lives and careers easier since the 1930s. At the same time, riders' speed increased, as the winners' mean speed since the 1930s illustrates in figure 1 .4. This reflects major long-term changes in the quality of riders' equipment, road quality and bicycle weight. Riders' increasing speed also reflects changes in the rules of bicycle races. Until the 1930s, Giro riders had to repair their damaged bicycles, i.e. they were not allowed to replace them with new material, and Tour riders even had to perform those repairs without any help.
And until the 1930s riders were not allowed to use derailleur gears, which made them go slower in both ascents and descents. Riders' better physical preparation (diet, training and doping) also probably had an impact on their performances. A similar increase in riders' speed is observed in the classics, in which distances have remained (broadly) constant over time. Typical race average speeds in the early twentieth century were often below 30 kilometers per hour while typical modern events exceed 40 kilometers per hour.
However, the interest of professional road cycling depends less on riders' performance than on competitive balance and outcome uncertainty. The time difference between the winner and the second-best rider, which is one indicator of competitive balance, steeply declined from the 1920s to the 1930s, and then from the 1950s to the 1960s. As a result, while gaps of 30 minutes or more were common until the 1920s, typical gaps are less than 3 minutes today. It is no wonder, then, that the closest victories did not occur earlier than the 1948 Giro (11 seconds), the 1984 Vuelta (6 seconds) and the legendary 1989 Tour (8 seconds). Fuller analyses of the long-term evolution of Grand Tours' competitive balance should complement this simple approach to individual "competitiveness" with indicators based on teams', not just riders' performances (Andreff 2013) . Obviously, race organizers know better than anyone else that competitive balance is a major determinant of the success of a race, and they have long struggled to maintain or increase it.
After il campionissimo Alfredo Binda had already won the 1925 , 1927 and 1928 Giri (in 1927 he won 12 out of 15 stages and was leader from the beginning to the end), he won 8 consecutive stages and the whole 1929 race, and the crowd booed him. This is why the following year the Giro organizers paid him 22,500 lire, i.e. the equivalent of the general classification victory and several stage victories, so that he did not participate in the 1930
Giro. And the same year, the Tour organizers had to give him start money to convince him to participate in the Tour. When in 1934 Tour organizers included the king-of-the-mountains classification, they also organized the first individual time trial so that not only climbers but also riders who are strong on the flat may win the race. In the 1952 Tour, race organizers included a fighting-spirit prize for the rider who attacks the most and when the campionissimo The analysis of cycling performances will be discussed in detail in chapter 12. Interested readers could also consult Torgler (2007), Prinz and Wicker (2012) and Rogge et al. (2013) .
Conclusion
As most economic sectors, since the late 19 th century professional cycling has benefitted from increasing labor division. Amateur bicycle racers now become professionals at a younger age than a century ago. They do no longer need to keep some other, more predictable job along with their sport career. Since the 1930s, professional riders have also been specializing into certain roles in their team, whether it be sprinters, flat riders or climbers. Most riders are domestiques whose main role is to help their team leader win. The observed increase in performance inequality among Tour de France riders since the 1970s is entirely due to an increase in performance inequalities within, not between teams (Candelon and Dupuy 2010), which means that domestiques sacrifice their own chances more and more to help their team leader win and then share his prizes. Riders' physical preparation is also optimized. While the Italian campionissimo Fausto Coppi introduced a scientific approach to diet, training and equipment as early as the 1940s, it is only since the 1980s that science (biomechanics, aerodynamics, etc.) significantly contributes to performance. Finally, since the 1990s, starting with riders like Greg LeMond and Miguel Indurain, team leaders ceased to participate in most events of the cycling calendar. While some champions specialize in the classics, others specialize in 'Grand Tours'. Nowadays, teams' riders who specialize in the 'Grand Tours' are also grouped into squads (sub-teams) which adjust their yearly fitness peak to be best prepared for one specific 'Grand Tour'.
